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Market-based, competitive bidding processes, i.e., 
auctions, are becoming a dominant policy instrument 
for securing future electricity production from 
renewable energy sources (RES) around the world. 
The rapid growth is striking: in 2005, only six countries 
employed RES auctions, and by 2017 at least 84 
countries had adopted the mechanism 1,2. This article 
outlines the rationale for the shift, describes some of 
the key design characteristics of auctions, together 
with best practices and potential pitfalls, and briefly 
considers the future of auctions in the face of declining 
support needs.
The research underpinning this article was 
developed by AURES, a European Horizon 2020 
project. Between 2015 and 2017, it supported the 
implementation of RES auctions in EU Member states. 
Through theory-based work, empirical analysis of 
auctions in 12 European and 8 non-European countries, 
model simulations and economic experiments, AURES 
generated new insights on the applicability of specific 
auction designs under different market conditions and 
policy goals. A second phase of the project (AURES II) is 
currently ongoing (aures2project.eu).
A RES auction is usually a procurement auction 
(or tender), where a certain volume of new RES is 
demanded by a government (or private) entity. Bidders 
compete to be selected to deliver (part of) the volume 
based on the financial support they require (often a 
premium in EUR/MWh). Typically, the projects with the 
lowest required support win the auction and are then 
granted the right to receive support payments for a 
given period of time.
Non-discriminatory volume control mechanisms 
with competitive price determination
Two main arguments are often identified as driving 
the use of RES auctions: First, they allow an efficient 
allocation of support at a level that is competitively 
determined and reflects realistic cost for the selected 
projects at the time when they are built. Second, 
they allow for non-discriminatory and competitive 
volume control of RES deployment (i.e., avoiding first-
come-first-served schemes) and thus control of total 
support budgets. Both of these can be attractive to 
policymakers faced with growing support commitments 
that burden consumers/taxpayers. Additionally, the 
maturing of many renewable technologies means that 
exposure to more competitive mechanisms might 
now be more appropriate than previously when more 
protective feed-in tariffs were the support mechanism 
of choice 3.
Auctions are also extremely 
flexible allocation mechanisms, 
allowing policymakers to 
specify when to call for a 
certain amount of new RES 
deployment, what technologies 
are to be supported, which 
type of support they receive 
and when projects should be 
delivered. As with other RES 
support schemes, the success of auctions depends 
on the design elements chosen and how well they 
address specific characteristics of the technologies and 
markets. 
The switch to auctions entails several new 
implications through the introducing of direct and 
immediate competition between RES projects. Not 
all ‘good’ projects can be developed anymore – 
competition only arises if there are more projects 
bidding than are awarded. RES developers are thus 
forced to move from a rather ‘technocratic’ focus on 
optimising their own projects, into becoming ‘strategic’ 
competitors, where the success of one’s projects 
depends on the strength (or weakness) of others. This 
is also a challenge for policymakers: They now have 
to take care of 1) ensuring sufficient competition for a 
well-functioning price formation, 2) avoiding undesired 
incentives, collusion and other market distortions, and 
importantly 3) dealing with risk of low realisation rates, 
e.g., caused by underbidding or the existence of non-
cost barriers (such as timing or permits).
Mixed results with RES auctions so far due 
to challenging design compromises
Renewable energy auctions have had a difficult 
history. Some early experiences showed either very 
low project realisation rates or lack of competition 
(too few bidders), which resulted in high costs due 
to flawed design 4,5. We have found that auctions can 
only successfully contribute to achieving effective and 
efficient RES deployment if they are designed to match 
the specific market environment in the area where 
the auction is conducted. In addition, certain design 
choices pose trade-offs, e.g., prequalification rules 
can increase realisation rates but also the risks and 
costs for bidders, potentially lowering competition and 
cost-efficiency. At a broader level, policymakers often 
pursue several policy goals with a single mechanism, 
and are, for example, concerned with encouraging local 
industries or actor diversity through auctions. Finding 
a balance between different policy goals without 
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compromising on well-functioning price formation is a 
challenging task. However, improved understanding of 
the pitfalls of auctions led to more carefully designed 
auctions using appropriate safeguards. Today, many 
auctions have delivered on their policy goals and 
achieved renewable energy deployment at low costs.
When not to auction?
Auctions might not always be the best choice. There 
is strong empirical basis for considering alternatives to 
auctions in situations where 1) reasonable competition 
cannot be expected, 2) project costs are particularly 
uncertain due to external factors or 3) secondary 
policy goals, such as ensuring local added value or 
actor diversity, are being pursued. These situations 
occur often when policymakers are seeking to promote 
immature or innovative RES technologies. The empirical 
insight that immature technologies in small markets 
are best supported outside of competitive auction 
mechanisms is also supported by recent theoretical 
work 6.
What influences auction design?
The design of a RES auction needs to reflect several 
aspects, including political priorities, technology 
characteristics, the country’s market and socio-
institutional context and the auctioneer’s capabilities. 
Policymakers pursue policy goals with different 
priorities, which influences the optimal choice of design 
elements. For example, it is by now commonly agreed 
that prequalifications are a must in any RES auction 
(see below), but their stringency is directly affected by 
policy priorities. Compared to strict prequalifications, 
lenient ones may lead to lower support costs, but also 
lower realisation rates. This illustrates one of the trade-
offs policymakers face when designing an auction.
Many design choices, such as auction format 
(single- or multi-unit), volumes and frequency, depend 
on technological characteristics, including unit sizes 
and cost structures. RES technologies have diverse 
characteristics (e.g., regarding planning procedures) 
and are therefore impacted in different ways by the 
same design elements (e.g., realisation periods). 
Market characteristics that must be considered when 
designing auctions are the expected market potential 
and how this relates to the auction volumes, as well as 
long-term project pipelines compared to deployment 
targets. The expected number of bidders and bids, 
potential bidder structure, competitive positioning of 
bidders and risk of collusion, the distribution of project 
costs among bidders (how asymmetric they are), and 
the relative strengths of bidders and how familiar 
they are with each other (how well they can assess 
each other’s costs), are all important aspects that 
policymakers need to consider for successful market 
facilitation.
Not to be neglected are institutional resources 
and capabilities. Policymakers designing the auction 
and auctioneers undertaking the auctions must have 
sufficient resources to deal with the challenges that 
auctions imply. Often, the required design solutions are 
highly context-specific and what works in one market 
is not necessarily applicable to another. The optimal 
design of an auction in a certain market therefore may 
be very different from the optimal design in a different 
market or even time period. In fact, occasional small 
changes to auction design over time are helpful, as 
bidders have less chance of becoming too familiar 
with one particular design. This helps avoiding implicit 
collusion.
Setting auction volumes is challenging
Setting an appropriate volume level is a challenging, 
but critical issue. Auction volumes can be defined in 
terms of capacity (MW), generation (MWh), or budget 
(million €). Each of these options has benefits and 
drawbacks. So far, capacity caps have been the most 
common, while budget caps have been introduced 
in three of the countries analysed in AURES 7,8. A 
budget-based volume provides certainty on the upper 
level of support costs, but not on the total amount of 
capacity deployed or electricity generated. A capacity-
based volume provides the strongest signal about 
the future market size (for project developers and 
equipment manufacturers) and it allows for early 
auction result assessment (as soon as the capacity 
is commissioned). But it does not provide certainty 
on the exact amount of RES production, which is the 
typical measure in political RES target setting (i.e., as a 
percentage of electricity demand) 2. Generation-based 
auction volumes make it easier to plan and monitor 
political target achievement, and also facilitate grid 
management. However, the variability in production 
of some RES makes it difficult to make definitive 
contractual arrangements regarding the support 
payments.
Auction formats and pricing rules 
are less problematic
The choice between auction format (single-item 
or multiple-item), auction type (dynamic or static), 
and pricing rule (uniform or pay-as-bid) is inarguably 
intertwined. Policymakers often discuss at great length 
which auction type and pricing rule to choose. Complex 
auction types (i.e., dynamic ascending or descending 
clock) may seem, depending on the technology 
and format, most desirable for achieving efficient 
outcomes. However, during the work in AURES, we 
have found that they also attract fewer eligible bids, 
and are less favourable especially in the early phases 
of auction introduction, when some policy learning 
must be expected: due to the very context-specific 
design requirements, RES auctions are predestined for 
unforeseen strategic incentives and loopholes that later 
need to be mitigated. This is generally much easier in 
a simple static format. Simpler designs are also more 
robust against unclear market situations and irrational 
actions of inexperienced bidders.
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Uniform pricing is regularly referred to as the 
theoretically favourable option due to its incentive 
compatibility, i.e., the bidders’ optimal strategy is to 
bid according to their true costs. Indisputably, this is 
a much-desired characteristic for both the auctioneer 
(to learn from the bids) and bidders (easily calculated 
bids). However, this characteristic only holds under 
particular (theoretic) assumptions that almost never 
materialise in realistic auction implementations. As 
soon as bidders participate with more than one bid, in 
more than one auction round or their costs have some 
common components (e.g., PV-module prices), uniform 
pricing is no longer incentive compatible, and thus 
cannot be expected to automatically lead to superior 
results as compared to pay-as-bid. Most countries 
analysed in AURES used pay-as-bid, which is relatively 
robust against irrational actions.   
Maybe surprisingly for some, the choice of pricing 
rule is not nearly as significant for efficient results 
as other factors such as the level of competition, or 
whether ceiling prices, prequalifications and penalties 
are designed well. Experiences with PV pilot auctions 
in Germany have, for example, shown that alternating 
between uniform pricing and pay-as-bid pricing 
rules seemed to have no significant influence on the 
resulting price. 
Technology focus: Separate or pooled?
The question of whether to conduct separate 
auctions for each RES technology or to pool them 
together is a much debated topic. From a static 
perspective, combining several technologies in one 
auction is more allocatively efficient than separate 
technology-specific auctions: requiring all relevant 
projects to compete with each other will result in 
awarding the projects with the lowest costs. However, 
from a dynamic system perspective, one must take 
into account the prospect of technology learning: 
supporting technologies which are currently more 
expensive can help them become the most cost-
efficient ones in the future. The extraordinary price 
decreases of solar PV are evidence for this. 
Furthermore, the competitive pressure in multi-
technology auctions may result in stop-and-go 
development for certain technologies, which is 
particularly challenging for smaller, single-technology 
project developers (e.g., in the Netherlands, onshore 
wind and PV were crowded out by cheaper RES heat 
technologies in the 2012-2013 auctions).
Multi-technology auctions are often adopted on 
the basis that they would lead to lower support 
costs. However, the opposite is often the case: in 
technology-specific auctions, support levels can be 
better differentiated by technology. This is a direct 
effect under uniform pricing where technology-specific 
auctions result in different prices per technology 
instead of one overall price, so that prices become 
more tightly linked to the costs of each technology. 
The reduction also materialises in pay-as-bid auctions 
through competitive effects where bidders with 
cheaper technologies tend to bid more aggressively 
when only competing against each other in their own 
separate auction.
In recent years, the concept of ‘technology neutral’ 
auctions has emerged. In fact, it is very difficult to 
design an auction that is actually neutral to all eligible 
technologies within it. The different technologies 
have diverse characteristics (e.g., regarding planning 
procedures) and are therefore impacted differently 
by the same prequalification criteria and realisation 
periods. To avoid favouritism, the auction design 
tends to be very complex (and ultimately specific per 
technology). Ensuring a level playing field when setting 
design elements such as ceiling prices, material and 
financial prequalifications, penalties and realisation 
deadlines can therefore become challenging. 
Reliable long-term auction 
schedules are indispensable
A long-term auction schedule ensures a degree 
of certainty for investors to avoid both unnecessary 
investor risks and unfavourable auction outcomes. An 
auction undertaken without any envisaged repetition 
for the future could potentially push bidders to 
underbid in an attempt to limit their losses especially 
when they already are in late project development 
phases. Auctions may then seem successful as they 
result in low support levels, but this may eventually 
lead to low realisation rates and the failure to achieve 
RES targets. Empirical analysis carried out in AURES 
shows that continuity in auction rounds, rather than 
“stop-and-go” implementation, increases long-term 
planning certainty for market players 7. Visibility of 
upcoming auction rounds with fixed dates enables 
the supply chain to plan for participation, and develop 
projects accordingly. This can add to high auction 
participation, as seen e.g., in California 9. 
A main lesson from AURES is that auction frequency 
is context- and technology-dependent. In general, a 
lower auction frequency is appropriate for technologies 
with potentially fewer bidders and larger project sizes 
(such as offshore wind) and more frequent rounds 
in the case of technologies (or technology groups) 
with more potential participants (such as solar PV). 
If markets are large enough, it can be beneficial to 
undertake auctions several times a year but it is 
also common that, in small markets, auctions are 
undertaken once a year or even less often 10.
Realisation safeguards are a must
The primary aim of prequalification criteria and 
penalties is to secure high project realisation and 
reduce delays. Material prequalifications such as 
requiring a certain project development stage or 
permits have proven to be an important safeguard 
for project realisation. They also reduce the risk of 
the Winner’s Curse (where winning bidders are struck 
by higher than expected costs), because they force 
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bidders to develop projects well before entering an 
auction, thus improving cost estimates. But they also 
increase sunk costs for project developers and increase 
non-allocation risk. 
Penalties and connected financial prequalifications 
(through bid bonds) are also an important safeguard 
for project realisation, and can reduce incentives for 
underbidding and delays. However, they increase 
bidder risks, potentially leading to higher prices. If 
penalties are high and financial guarantees difficult 
to obtain, they may deter project developers from 
participating in the auction, which reduces the level of 
competition and may increase bid prices 11.
Protecting actor diversity is possible but 
needs to be applied with caution
Auctions can lead to higher market concentration, 
as smaller market actors and private investors are less 
able to cope with the complexity and competiveness 
of auctions. We have seen some examples of 
policymakers trying to protect small community actors 
by designated rules that reduce the auction risk for 
certain bidder groups. AURES analysis showed that 
auctions can use the following means to protect 
certain actor groups: 1) reduced financial/material 
prequalification, 2) implementing different pricing rules 
(e.g., favoured actors are granted the highest accepted 
bid even in pay-as-bid auctions), 3) creating contingents 
(quotas). Nevertheless, those measures should be 
applied with caution, since they can affect and distort 
the auction outcome significantly. Also, defining ‘small’ 
or ‘community’ actors is challenging and favourable 
treatment creates an incentive for all actors to try to 
be deemed eligible for it (e.g., in Germany, preferential 
rules led to the creation of artificial citizen energy 
communities for onshore wind who were awarded 
more than 90% of the auction volume in 2017).
Desirable projects and/or actors can also be 
favoured outside an auction, for example by providing 
them with additional legal and advisory support during 
participation, or by exempting them from participating 
in the auctions altogether and instead supporting them 
with administratively-set tariffs.
Auctions, a suitable and effective RES 
policy tool for now and the future
RES auctions can be a suitable instrument for 
allocating support under budget and volume limitations 
and can achieve significant short-term efficiency gains. 
However, auctions are not the silver bullet superior to 
any other support allocation mechanism. The success 
of any given auction depends on how well is it tailored 
to national market conditions and policy goals, and 
synchronised with project development activities by the 
industry. This requires certain institutional capacity.
Auctions are extremely flexible and their design can 
be adapted to local circumstances and reflect changes 
in the broader context. As the costs of renewable 
technologies decline, there is increasing attention 
on the possibility of eliminating support for some 
technologies. In this context, it would be possible 
to conduct ‘subsidy free auctions’ where there is no 
premium payment, but the support comes from a 
guaranteed buyer for a project’s generation or from 
the cost-free provision of the necessary infrastructure, 
e.g., the site or the grid connection. Moves towards 
this can be seen from recent offshore wind auctions 
in Germany (2017) and the Netherlands (2018). As 
familiarity with auctions grows, also new actors are 
entering the arena. While current RES auctions are 
typically conducted by government entities on the 
grounds of national interest, they may also become 
the mechanism of choice for other actors such as large 
industrial companies to procure long-term renewable 
electricity in a cost-efficient manner. The flexibility of 
the mechanism suggests that it will remain popular 
with policymakers and the energy industry as the shift 
towards greater decarbonisation continues. 
Footnote
1 Estimates can be derived using average values per technology (e.g., 
annual full-load hours).
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